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Saving friends or saving strangers?
Critical humanitarianism and the geopolitics
of international law
THOMAS MOORE*
Abstract. What can critical geopolitics contribute to an understanding of the political dynamics
of humanitarianism within International Relations? This article demands a reconsideration of
the concept of humanitarianism by examining the spatial ordering of international society and
the geopolitics of international law that condition our understanding of humanitarian agency
and conduct within IR. The focus on critical geopolitics seeks to identify the normative struc-
ture of humanitarianism and how humanitarian claims – which are seemingly universal – are
constituted through speciﬁc geopolitical discourses that structure agency and conduct within
international life. Considering how humanitarianism is discursively structured as a geopolitical
concept involves taking humanitarianism beyond its methodological privileging of impartiality,
neutrality, and universality in making sense of humanitarianism. Critical humanitarianism
does not accept the grounding of humanitarianism within an intuitive moral framework but
instead locates humanitarian agency and conduct within a spatialised understanding of the
international system. Such a spatialised ordering of humanitarianism takes the analytical focus
away from ‘saving strangers’ (Wheeler) and ‘global conscience’ (Linklater) towards a con-
sideration of the ways in which international law is the product of historical particulars that
reﬂect a complex political sociology of the state (Schmitt).
Thomas Moore is Principal Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics
and International Relations at the University of Westminster. His research interests are in the
ﬁeld of international political theory and geopolitical theory within International Relations,
with a focus on the political writings of Carl Schmitt. His most recent publications include:
‘Citizens into Wolves: Carl Schmitt’s Fictive Account of Security’ in Cooperation and Conﬂict
(2011) and ‘The Paradox of the Political: Carl Schmitt’s Autonomous Account of Politics’ in
The European Legacy (2010).
Introduction: Humanitarianism and the geopolitical order
The use of military power for humanitarian ends without due consideration of the
geopolitical assumptions within humanitarian discourse fundamentally undermines
the capacity of humanitarianism to operate as a valid category for intervention within
international law. The tendency to invoke the normative category of the ‘stranger’
within humanitarian discourse fails to represent the political basis of intervention
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within International Relations. Many have drawn upon the stranger as the subject
of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler, 2000; Walzer, 2006; Geras, 1999) but this
generic rendering of the subject to be saved or rescued overlooks the political con-
stitution of subjectivity in international law. A humanitarianism which appeals to
the moral responsibility of alleviating the suffering of distant strangers (Habermas,
2000) is not sufﬁciently embedded in the geopolitical and historical landscape of
International Relations. Not only does it assume that the Kantian project of cosmo-
politan law has achieved legitimacy in a clearly deﬁned international society, but it
overlooks the ways in which modern militaries are still located within bordered logics
of security. Critical humanitarianism challenges the capacity of a universal account
of ‘the stranger’ to perform the work of humanitarian international law. Rather
than look to international law as the framework in which vulnerable subjects are
rescued from their states (and, sometimes, themselves) this article argues that the
Schmittian friend-and-enemy grouping provides a useful basis to critique the univer-
sality of the humanitarian project.
Much has been made of the humanitarian turn within International Relations
and its potential to reimagine the normative contours of sovereignty within the inter-
national system. The sizeable literature discussing the ramiﬁcations of the ‘humani-
tarian turn’ in the aftermath of the Cold War has raised important questions about
the predominance of Westphalian norms in determining our conceptions of political
agency in international discourse. Whilst the term ‘humanitarianism’ has circulated
widely within political discourse since the 1990s it is important to avoid assuming
that the term ‘humanitarianism’ can be expressed deﬁnitively and decisively. Humani-
tarianism is a political discourse, involving the constitutive patterning of political
subjects and establishing levels of agency which speak to speciﬁc geopolitical construc-
tions of identity and action. Laclau and Mouffe provide us with a critical platform to
challenge the singularity of humanitarianism, allowing a reading of humanitarianism
as political discourse. This understanding of humanitarianism focuses on the concep-
tual architecture of humanitarianism and how this is linked to social logics which are
inscribed within speciﬁc discourses.1 As Laclau and Mouffe observe in relation to key
concepts in political discourse, ‘all of them are contingent social logics which, as
such, acquire their meaning in precise conjunctural and relational contexts, where
they will always be limited by other – frequently contradictory – logics’.2
It is important to note the connection between discourses of humanitarianism and
forms of intervention within the discipline of International Relations. This has clear
implications for understanding the humanitarian turn within International Relations
since the end of the Cold War. If we follow the claim that humanitarianism is always
conjunctural and relational then we should exercise caution in exclusively binding
humanitarianism to military intervention within International Relations. It is important
to note that discourses of humanitarian intervention are not necessarily compatible
with discourses of international law. Humanitarian intervention and international law
occupy different spatial and political categories.3 When we understand humanitarian
1 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics (London: Verso, 2001), p. 142.
2 Ibid.
3 I am particularly grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this demarcation.
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intervention as automatically synonymous within international law the underlying
geopolitical dynamics of both international law and humanitarian discourses are
supressed. Martti Koskenniemi has noted that international ‘legal argument proceeds
by establishing a system of conceptual differentiations and using it in order to justify
whatever doctrine, position or rule (that is, whatever argument) one needs to justify’.4
Discussing humanitarianism, whether reﬂected in discourses of humanitarian interven-
tion and/or international law, necessarily involves a justiﬁcatory claim about the
scope and capacity of international community. This article seeks to understand
how these traditional discourses of geopolitics are inadequate to the task of making
sense of humanitarianism. Traditional geopolitics has involved the privileging of the
state as the primary actor within International Relations. As Eudaily and Smith have
argued, this has meant a focus on ‘the placement, arrangements, and disposition of
borders that neatly circumscribe a particular territory’.5 Critical geopolitics, on the
other hand, understands these territorial divisions as political imaginaries that condi-
tion our understanding of humanitarianism itself. By questioning the rigid certainty
of traditional formations of geopolitics there is an implicit challenge to accounts of
sovereignty that underpin the state system model within International Relations.
Nonetheless, it is through such a critical appraisal of sovereignty that might en-
courage what Eudaily and Smith refer to as ‘experiments in possibility’.6 Thinking
about how humanitarianism contains a geopolitical dimension should not entail
looking at humanitarianism through the conceptual lens of the Westphalian state.
On the contrary, a critical geopolitics of humanitarianism allows us to see how the
Westphalian state has structured sovereignty as the central discourse of both interna-
tional law and International Relations and, in so doing, allows for a deconstruction
of the hegemonic formations are embedded within humanitarian discourse itself.
When we deﬁne humanitarianism we do so constitutively. This is not to say that
words mean what we choose them to mean but, more critically, to acknowledge how
humanitarian discourses constitute forms of knowledge about the capacity of inter-
national law within International Relations. The tendency to universalise is implicit
within the construction of the category of humanitarianism itself. In this regard, Alex
Bellamy has drawn attention to the diverse deployment of the term ‘humanitarian’
within International Relations, both in academic work and in foreign policy formu-
lations. According to Bellamy, the term ‘humanitarian’ ‘is linked to activities as
diverse as the pursuit of universal human rights, the prosecution of those guilty of
offending the ‘‘conscience of mankind’’, the delivery of emergency aid for human
subsistence, and the use of military force in a variety of circumstances’.7 Nonetheless,
despite the lack of clarity associated with the term ‘humanitarian’ Bellamy thinks
it possible to identify four principles associated with a humanitarian outlook. These
include:
(1) The principle of humanity. This is the idea that humanitarianism aims to ‘prevent and
alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found’. (2) The principle of impartiality. Humani-
4 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 10.
5 Sean Patrick Eudaily and Steve Smith, ‘Sovereign Geopolitics? – Uncovering the ‘‘Sovereignty Paradox’’ ’,
Geopolitics, 13:2 (2008), p. 313.
6 Ibid., p. 315.
7 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian responsibilities and interventionist claims in international society’,
Review of International Studies, 29:3 (2003), p. 335.
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tarianism does not distinguish between people according to race, sex, religion, nationality,
class, whether they live in a powerful state or strategically, or whether ‘we’ have interests there.
It distinguishes only according to need. (3) The principle of neutrality. Humanitarianism does
not take sides in a conﬂict and is only interested in ensuring that people have access to food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. (4) The principle of universality. Humanitarianism is
universally applicable and all humans have identical humanitarian rights.8
For this reason, universalising claims about humanitarianism need to be understood
through the constitutive patterning of order and sovereignty within International
Relations. Critical geopolitics furnishes us with both normative and spatial cognition
of how claims about humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and universality operationalise
speciﬁc humanitarian discourses. The deconstructive approach suggested by critical
geopolitics allows for greater awareness of the limitations of these grounding principles
of humanitarianism and, in so doing, allows us to sharpen our analytical framework
to consider how ‘the political’ informs the humanitarian. It proposes to insert the
political into humanitarianism by tracing the dimensions of geopolitics within both
discourses of international law and humanitarianism. Carl Schmitt’s legal theory
assists us in understanding how international law emerges through geopolitical
regimes and cautions against universalising what is particular to political orders in
the name of ‘humanity’. This article proceeds by examining some of the limitations
of deﬁning humanitarianism in terms of universalism. It then considers how claims
about humanitarianism contain a spatial dimension, which challenge the universalis-
ability of humanitarianism as a normative discourse. Finally, it considers how the
spatial mapping of humanitarian discourses through critical geopolitics allows for
a renegotiation of humanitarianism through critical perspectives on sovereignty and
violence in International Relations.
Aligning Carl Schmitt with a critical discourse of geopolitics and humanitarianism
requires an awareness of the embedded nature of time and space within International
Relations. As Hutchings has observed in relation to conceptions of time in Interna-
tional Relations, we should be careful of endowing ‘international political time with
a uniﬁed meaning (principles of freedom and/or reason) that does not match the
plurality of political temporality across the realm of international politics’.9 The
liberal project of humanitarianism has overwhelmingly treated international law
as the slow (but nonetheless progressive) realisation of normative principles within
international legal jurisprudence. Ju¨rgen Habermas expresses this in terms of creat-
ing ‘a constant and stable acknowledgement of human rights’ which initially is
characterised by ‘low level institutionalisation of international law’.10 For Habermas,
this international normative order of human rights cannot be separated from the
international legal order. Such a legal order is the enactment of cosmopolitanism
and allows for the radical reconﬁguration of principles of sovereignty in International
Relations. Habermas expresses this as the systematic legalisation of international
relations: ‘It is precisely the institutionalization of legal procedures that will protect
the juridically-tamed manner of dealing with violations of human rights from both
8 Ibid., p. 337.
9 Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Happy anniversary! Time and critique in international relations theory’, Review
of International Studies, 33:S1 (2007), p. 78.
10 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Legality and Morality’,
Constellations, 6:3 (1999), p. 269.
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a dedifferentiation of the law and an unmediated moral discrimination against
‘‘enemies’’ ’.11
Habermas’ cosmopolitan order is predicated on the functional and moral utility
of universal justiﬁcation within the international legal order. Formulating interna-
tional law as a cosmopolitan question – that is, linking developments in international
law with the institutional enactment of cosmopolitan principles – is a particularly
strong feature of recent, largely liberal, scholarship in International Relations.
Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that ‘[i]nternational law and international politics
cohabit the same conceptual space’ and that ‘it makes little sense to study one without
the other’.12 In projecting a liberal vision of international law Slaughter calls for the
Grundnorm of sovereignty to be reimagined so that it reﬂects liberal assumptions
about state functioning. The assumption being that liberal international law is
distinct from Realist conceptions of international law that dominate the ﬁeld of inter-
national politics: ‘The young discipline of international relations surged to respect-
ability on the tide of Realism, proffering a hard-boiled code of conduct for the Cold
War and disdaining the dangerous moralism of international law.’13
A critical geopolitics of humanitarianism must therefore tread a ﬁne line between
saying that all law that is humanitarian is cosmopolitan and all law that is based on
the brute exercise of political power is the enemy of humanitarian norms. Chandler
has argued in relation to the changing discourse of sovereignty that ‘[r]ather than
starting from politics, from social forces and the clash of interests in society, many
theorists start from ethics and norms and then seek to derive (non-exclusionary)
political frameworks from this basis’.14 A critical geopolitics of humanitarianism
acknowledges the co-constitutive nature of humanitarian law. International legal
norms are inscribed by social forces (material as well as ideational) that generate
new understandings of ethical agency within international politics. There is a danger
in thinking that cosmopolitanism provides the normative blueprint for the ‘humani-
tarian turn’ within international law. This would overlook the complex historical
sociology of sovereignty within international politics and the ways in which claims
about humanitarianism entail the spatial ordering of knowledges about the capacity
of international law.
Using Carl Schmitt to understand the critical geopolitics of humanitarianism
must also take into account the historical dimensions of his scholarship on law,
politics, and constitutionalism in the early twentieth century. At the same time, it is
important to consider the strategic reinvention of Schmitt’s ideas for political theory
and how scholarship within International Relations has framed questions of state
violence through a critical engagement with Schmitt’s key works.15 Without a doubt,
Carl Schmitt is a divisive ﬁgure in the intellectual milieu of the early twentieth
11 Ibid., p. 268.
12 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 6:1 (1995), p. 503.
13 Ibid.
14 David Chandler, ‘Potemkin Sovereignty: Statehood Without Politics in the New World Order’, The
Monist, 9:1 (2007), p. 94.
15 There has been an extensive discussion amongst IR scholars within the past decade concerning the
critical reception of Carl Schmitt within international political theory. Notable contributions include:
David Chandler, ‘The Revival of Carl Schmitt in International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical
Theorists?’, Millennium: Journal of International Relations, 37:27 (2008), pp. 27–48; Louisa Odysseos,
‘Dangerous ontologies: the ethos of survival and ethical theorizing in International Relations’, in Fabio
Petito and Louisa Odysseos (eds), The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal
Saving friends or saving strangers? 929
century. Gopal Balakrishnan warns against treating Schmitt as a ‘period piece’
claiming that his ideas are ‘still unexplored contents of a time capsule’.16 Mark Lilla
has argued that the ‘left-wing case made for studying Schmitt is certainly a curiosity
but also more interesting and radical than the conservative one’.17 At the same time,
we should not evaluate Schmitt’s contribution to international politics on the basis of
ideological conceptions of international order; rather, we should think about how
Schmitt’s spatial framing of international order provides a platform to understand
the contemporary dynamics of continuity and change in international politics.
The friend and enemy distinction has played a central role in the dissemination
of Carl Schmitt’s ideas within international political theory. This is expressed most
decisively in The Concept of the Political where Schmitt argues that the friend and
enemy distinction ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or a separation,
of an association or dissociation’.18 The friend and enemy distinction underscores
the importance of political judgment and geopolitical framing (as contained in his
account of nomos discussed below) for making sense of our conceptions of inter-
national order within world politics. It is important not to take this distinction at
face value, as the categorisations of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ are themselves the products
of discourses that emerge from social forces within political communities.19 The
current discussion does not set out to provide a critical biography of Schmitt’s oeuvre
from a historical perspective; on the contrary it seeks to identify the critical potential
of his geopolitical writings for unpacking the spatial assumptions that are present
within the humanitarian turn within International Relations. In evaluating whether
humanitarianism is a discourse concerned with saving strangers or saving friends the
intention is to challenge the highly normativised account of humanitarian agency
within international politics.
International law should be understood in terms of multiple articulations of legality
(and illegality) within international politics. Scholars of International Relations are no
different from ‘the lawyers’ in conceptualising international law from both different
starting points (and ultimately end points) within public discourse. Koskenniemi has
observed this in relation to the politicisation of international law, arguing that ‘[t]his
is why much about the search for political direction today takes the form of jurisdic-
tional conﬂict, struggle between competing expert vocabularies, each equipped with
a speciﬁc bias’.20 Law has always had a geopolitical dimension, framed through
dominant discourses of geopolitical enmity within international politics. But increas-
ingly, as can be evidenced through the humanitarian turn, international law has been
War and the Crisis of Global Order (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Michael C Williams,
‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly,
47 (2007), pp. 511–31; and Roland Axtmann, ‘Humanity or Enmity? Carl Schmitt on International
Politics’, International Politics, 44 (2007), pp. 531–51. The special edition of the Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law, 19:1 (2006) contains some insightful interventions concerning the status of Carl Schmitt’s
ideas within international legal thought.
16 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), p. 9.
17 Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York: New York Review Book, 2001),
p. 63.
18 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 26.
19 For further consideration of the paradoxical dimensions of the friend and enemy distinction within Carl
Schmitt’s writings see Thomas Moore, ‘The Paradox of the Political: Carl Schmitt’s Autonomous
Account of Politics’, The European Legacy, 15:6 (2010), pp. 721–34.
20 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’, The European Journal of
International Law, 20:1 (2009), p. 7.
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understood in terms of normative categories of value. Carl Schmitt’s account of
international law challenges this normativisation by emptying international law of its
ideological pretensions and exposing the false teleologies contained within the respec-
tive traditions of international law outlined in classic political thought (liberal, socialist,
Marxist, realist, etc.).
These political dynamics of international law (and, by implication, humanitarianism)
are evident in the allied relationship between just war theory and humanitarian inter-
vention within International Relations. It is not surprising that the key texts in
the ﬁeld of humanitarian intervention draw explicitly on the just war tradition in
locating humanitarianism within a moral framework. Contemporary just war theory
highlights the role of public deliberation about the use of violence by militaries and
largely embeds decisions concerning jus ad bellum within a communitarian frame-
work. At the same time, this awareness of the communitarian basis of deliberations
about warfare and humanitarianism is not sufﬁciently informed by geopolitical
understandings about the spatial divisions within International Relations. For this
reason, Walzer’s classic deﬁnition of humanitarianism within just war theory appeals
to a universal on the one hand (acts which ‘shock the moral conscience of mankind’)
but the decision about military intervention are necessarily worked out through the
particulars of speciﬁc political communities. Walzer’s vocabulary is decidedly univer-
salist and is based on an intuitive understanding of morality:
It is not the conscience of political leaders that one refers to in such cases. They have other
things to worry about and may well be required to repress their normal feelings of indignation
and outrage. The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired
in their course of their everyday activities.21
The ability of political elites to draw upon the abstract moral vocabulary of the just
war tradition lends the justiﬁcation of a given military intervention a greater degree
of credibility. The tendency to treat the just war tradition as a rigid set of criteria –
just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality, probability
of success – undermines the possibility of comprehending the complex nature of
the just war tradition within International Relations. The dimensions of the just war
cannot be reduced down to a list of criteria that need to be satisﬁed in order to make
war just and thereby legitimate. On the contrary, it is important to take into account
the very basis of the just war tradition and how these are negotiated through individual
political communities. For this reason, drawing attention to the geopolitical basis of
claims about humanitarianism and the discourse of the ‘just’ war reveals the content
of humanitarian values (their motivation, their circulation as political concepts, and
their implementation militarily).
The tension between localism and universalism has important implications for the
way in which humanitarian claims about intervention are legitimated within public
discourse. Justifying the use of force for humanitarian ends is not simply an exercise
in political rhetoric but entails an assessment of the types of justiﬁcation used within
humanitarian discourse. In this regard, there appears to be a contradiction between
localism and universalism in Walzer’s understanding of humanitarianism and how
this is related to questions of democratisation. This is expressed in Walzer’s claim
that ‘struggles for democratization, whatever help they receive from outsiders, are
21 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 107.
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always local struggles. Their protagonists do not aim at the triumph of cosmopolitan
principles around the world. They want a state of their own, in the literal sense of
that term – a state governed’.22 Yet this localism, expressed in terms of the struggle
of ‘local’ people, should not overlook the global dimension of democracy promotion
and how these are linked to geopolitical identities within international relations.
Moral justiﬁcations for democracy and humanitarian intervention are invariably
tinged with the preferences of individual actors within the international system. This is
not liberal domestic preference formation as such, but more a question of how human-
itarian framing generates from within particular identities, interests, and discourses.
Borrowing from Agnew, this article puts forward a critical understanding of
humanitarianism which acknowledges the dilemmas of sovereignty and how there is
a danger of falling into the ‘territorial trap’ traditionally associated with conventional
understandings of geopolitics.23 The division of the earth into ‘mutually exclusive
territorial states’ has operated as the dominant paradigm of geopolitics within Inter-
national Relations. The assumptions behind traditional geopolitics are signiﬁcant
to this discussion; namely, (a) states as ﬁxed units of sovereign space; (b) a division
between domestic politics and international politics; and (c) states as the ‘containers’
of society.24 This epistemological framework has conditioned our understanding of
how international life has been decisively structured as a relational space of states
vis-a`-vis other states against the backdrop of hegemonic power relations. Critical
geopolitics, contrastingly, forces us to think about the discursive structuring of space
within International Relations, allowing us to move beyond the ‘old school’ conclu-
sions of classical geopolitics.
With this in mind, the current focus on critical geopolitics seeks to identify the
normative structure of humanitarianism within International Relations: how are
humanitarian claims – which are seemingly universal – the products of speciﬁc geo-
political discourses that are the very foundations of the discipline of International
Relations? Humanitarian claims need to be understood as ‘speech acts’ well before
they are deployed as justiﬁcatory devices for armed intervention within international
society. Talk about ‘humanitarianism’ within International Relations has too often
focussed on the capacity problem; namely, the extent to which states and inter-
national institutions can develop capacity to successfully implement and achieve the
‘responsibility to protect’ (Bellamy: 2009; Evans: 2008; Pattison: 2008; Weiss: 2004).
Nonetheless, focussing on the capacity problem without due consideration of the
normative foundations of humanitarian discourse neglects the tendency of policy-
makers and political leaders to invoke the humanitarian alongside other political dis-
courses, notably that of ‘international security’. This tension between localism and
universalism can be discursively structured as the mutual compatibility between
humanitarian values and security strategy. This is most evident in the 2002 US
National Security Strategy which projects both localism and universalism in order to
demonstrate the afﬁnity between normative conceptions of democracy and America’s
strategic interests. As the 2002 National Security Strategy afﬁrms, ‘The US national
security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reﬂects
the union of our values and our national interests.’25
22 Michael Walzer, ‘On Promoting Democracy’, Ethics & International Affairs, 22:4 (2008), pp. 351–5.
23 John Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory’,
Review of International Political Economy, 1:1 (1994), pp. 53–80.
24 Ibid.
25 US National Security Strategy (2002), {http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf}
accessed 15 May 2011.
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For this reason, Walzer’s valorisation of local struggles for democracy highlights
a key problem in the justiﬁcation of humanitarian discourse and, more signiﬁcantly,
humanitarian intervention within international relations. This relates to the fact that
just war theory provides for both permission and restraint in the use of force within
international relations. Broadly speaking, just war theory is typically represented as a
compromise between unfettered realism on the one hand and an ungrounded idealism
on the other.26 Walzer acknowledges that states that carry out an intervention have
a particularly ‘heavy burden’ in justifying the violation of another state’s territorial
integrity and political sovereignty.27 Whilst Walzer does not establish a ban on
‘boundary crossings’ (or more correctly, on intervention) the presumption is that the
concept of sovereignty is so important for the international order that its violation
undermines the integrity of political community.28 In revising the legalist paradigm –
the grounding principle of the international order which establishes a presumption
in favour of territorial integrity and political sovereignty – there is an allowance
made for exceptions to the rule. For Walzer, this is ‘when the violation of human
rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or
self-determination or ‘‘arduous struggle’’ seem cynical, that is, in cases of enslave-
ment or massacre’.29
When advocates of just war theory authorise the use of force beyond the boundaries
of the legalist paradigm the question of selective and uneven derogation arises. Whilst
derogation in international law largely been understood from the perspective of human
rights discourse it is important to consider how the use of military force for humani-
tarian objectives involves derogating from the classic legalist paradigm within Inter-
national Relations. Discussion of derogation jurisprudence in the post-9/11 context
has involved negotiating the relationship between fundamental rights and state security.
This is reﬂected in legislative responses to terrorism at the national, regional, and inter-
national levels. The widespread deployment of derogation jurisprudence – whether
the Patriot Act (USA), the Prevention of Terrorism Act (UK), or the Border Pro-
tection Bill (Australia) – involves states agreeing new limits to fundamental rights
against the backdrop of new security threats. The emplacement of terrorism within an
‘armed conﬂict paradigm’ has meant that questions of criminality are now explicitly
linked to jus ad bellum and jus in bello.30
Derogation from just war norms under international law has attracted signiﬁcant
discussion from both legal and political scholars in the aftermath of the Global War
on Terror. Whether international law has been disregarded (Brunne´e and Toope) or
used to extend the scope of security exceptionalism in the Global War on Terror
(Johns) requires an appreciation of the normative and geopolitical dimensions of
international law.31 It is these dimensions which are signiﬁcant to understanding
26 Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, Mershon International Studies
Review, 42:2 (1998), p. 307. See also, Noberto Bobbio, Peace, War and International Politics (Turin:
Centro Studi Di Scienza Politica Paolo Farneti, 2007), p. 49.
27 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 86.
28 Ibid., p. 89.
29 Ibid., p. 90.
30 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’, European
Journal of International Law, 14:2 (2003), p. 264.
31 Jutta Brunne´e and Stephen J. Toope, ‘The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq’, International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53:4 (2004), pp. 785–806; Fleur E. Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the
Annihilation of the Exception’, European Journal of International Law, 16:4 (2005), pp. 613–35.
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how decisions about just war are enabled through interpretative networks and envi-
ronments. For this reason, international law dealing with the use of force must be
alert to the way in which exceptions to the rule are negotiated. The humanitarian
turn within international relations has undoubtedly involved a substantial renegotia-
tion of foundational discourse within international law and international relations.
The recharacterisation of sovereignty as discussed by the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (‘Responsibility to Protect’) called for a twin
understanding of sovereignty within international relations. In this regard, the excep-
tion to the long-standing principle of non-intervention under international law was
to be reformulated through increased emphasis on sovereignty as responsibility.
Arguing that ‘[t]here is no prospect of genuine equality among peoples unless the
sovereignty of states is respected and their capacity to protect their own citizens is
enhanced’ the doctrinal assumptions of the responsibility to protect principle seek to
entrench new exceptions within international law.32 Whilst these exceptions are obvi-
ously motivated by a desire to redress the false promises of international human
rights law (rather than their diminution) these exceptions are nonetheless negotiated
geopolitically.
How the geopolitical landscape of international relations contributes to the prac-
tice of humanitarianism under international law is essential for advancing a critical
humanitarianism perspective. In asking the question whether humanitarianism involves
the symbolic structuring of the ‘politics of rescue’ in terms of friends or strangers the
intention is to underscore how our understandings about friends and strangers are
inscribed within a social and political discourse. Michael Walzer does acknowledge
that humanitarian interventions are both politically risky and highly selective endeav-
ours. In assessing the NATO campaign in Kosovo, involving an extensive campaign
of aerial bombardment, Walzer is concerned that a ‘technological ﬁx’ was deployed
in order to reduce the possibility of military casualties.33 Acknowledging that US
national security was not ‘at stake’ in Kosovo, Walzer attempts to maintain a critical
stance for just war theory against the cooption of just war by Western militaries.34 In
stating that militaries must be prepared to mobilise their citizens (and, by implica-
tion, put their own lives at risk) for the purposes of averting humanitarian disaster
the focus is on the appropriateness of strategic responses to crisis. In this regard,
Walzer notes that ‘you can’t kill unless you are prepared to die’.35
The question of casualty aversion arises prominently in the 1990s, speciﬁcally in
the US military response to humanitarian emergency in Somalia and Kosovo.36 But
the question of casualty aversion still has contemporary signiﬁcance, notably in the
2011 military intervention in Libya to implement United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973. The issue of casualty aversion brings into view the remarkable dis-
juncture between humanitarian claims (which are seemingly universal) and national
interest (which are linked to particularism) within International Relations. Casualty
aversion concerns not just the desire of individual states to protect their own militaries
from harm but involves the attempt to minimise the direct and indirect political costs
32 ‘International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty’, The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 75.
33 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 100.
34 Ibid., p. 3.
35 Ibid., p. 101.
36 Cori Dauber, ‘Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on US Military Intervention’, Armed
Forces & Society, 27:2 (2001), p. 218.
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of a militarised approach to humanitarianism. For this reason, just war theory has
largely failed to address the representative dimensions of humanitarian agency and
action within international relations. Representation, and by implication, inter-
subjective understanding are key to making sense of the categories of agency that
are so prevalent within the just war tradition. These categories of political agency
arise speciﬁcally from the combatant/non-combatant distinction and are explicitly
linked to normative understandings of guilt and innocence within just war theory.
In deﬁning what is meant by the term ‘innocence’ Walzer draws again on metaphor:
An army, to be sure, has an enormous belly, and it must be fed if it is to ﬁght. But it is not its
belly but its arms that make it an army. Those men and women who supply its belly are doing
nothing peculiarly warlike. Hence their immunity from attack: they are assimilated to the rest
of the civilian population. We call them innocent people, a term of art which means that they
have done nothing, and are doing nothing, that entails the loss of their rights.37
The discourse of humanitarianism presupposes a range of political subjectivities that
derive from both the structure of the international system and our understanding
of guilt, innocence, and responsibility within international ethics. Those who defend
humanitarianism through international law assume that law is the most appropriate
way to confer humanitarian responsibility: ‘The Geneva Conventions and other
human rights and humanitarian treaties do therefore confer obligations upon human-
itarian organisations and it is absolutely right that the humanitarian system should
be held accountable to these norms.’38 The normative structure of humanitarianism
is often assessed from an institutional framework that places the emphasis on response
to humanitarian crisis. The failure of humanitarianism is reduced down to a failure
of institutional arrangements to secure fundamental human rights during times of
humanitarian crisis. This institutional failure is often linked to a lack of ‘political
will’ which must be remedied through independent monitoring of crisis regions and
communities.
To reduce the failure of humanitarianism down to a lack of political will means
that the normative structure of agency and action are largely overlooked in making
judgements about what constitutes a humanitarian emergency. Richard Rorty addressed
the question of representing pain in his discussion of ‘privileged representations’ in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. In asking why we send ‘pigs to the slaughter
with equanimity, but form societies for the protection of koalas’ Rorty sought to
understand how representations of pain (and prohibitions against harm) are hierar-
chically formed within a pre-linguistic framework.39 Conceptions of pain are linked
to intersubjective communities and this has real signiﬁcance for the discourse of
humanitarianism within International Relations. Rorty argued that ‘moral prohibi-
tions are expressions of a sense of community based on imagined possibility of con-
versation’.40 This ‘imagined conversation’ constitutes an important dimension of the
discourse of humanitarianism and is reﬂected in Kantian approaches to international
ethics which place hospitality at the forefront of humanitarian response.41
37 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 146.
38 Nicholas Stockton, ‘In Defence of Humanitarianism’, Disasters, 22:4 (1998), pp. 352–60.
39 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979),
p. 190.
40 Ibid.
41 Andrew Linklater, ‘Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations’, International Politics, 44 (2007),
p. 21.
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Whilst Andrew Linklater has identiﬁed the signiﬁcance of the category of the
stranger for making sense of cosmopolitan obligations the concern is primarily with
the question of distance and how these are ontologically grounded within a discourse
of ‘cosmopolitan emotions’.42 This must be supplemented by an analysis of how
privileged representations of certain types of humanitarian agency condition and
structure humanitarian action within International Relations. As Rorty notes in
relation to the constitutive basis of humanity, ‘[t]o be humanoid is to have a human
face, and the important part of that face is a mouth which we can imagine uttering
sentences in synchrony with appropriate expressions of the face as a whole.’43
James Pattison has sought to extend the scope of traditional just war theory in
relation to humanitarian intervention by taking representation as a necessary criteria
of just intervention. Drawing upon Hannah Pitkin’s work on political representation
the emphasis is on the internal and external representativeness of humanitarian
conduct within International Relations.44 The criteria proposed by Pattison is that
legitimate (humanitarian) intervention depends upon whether ‘an intervener’s deci-
sion making on the proposed intervention reﬂects the opinions of its citizens’ and
‘those individuals in the political community that is subject to the intervention’.45
Despite the fact that Pattison acknowledges that humanitarian intervention involves
‘extremely high moral stakes’ there is, nonetheless, an implicit assumption that ques-
tions of internal legitimacy ( justifying intervention to the political community under-
taking the intervention) can be resolved if there are high levels of public support and
opinion.46 This overlooks the question of the constitution of political community and
how political communities are shaped through exclusionary discourse. In acknowl-
edging that there was a high level of public support for Australia’s intervention in
East Timor must take into account the fact that Australian political community was
fuelled not only by humanitarian concerns but anxieties about asylum and immigra-
tion policy towards East Timor.47 Australia’s supposed humanitarian outlook must
be read in conjunction with a broader agenda of securitisation of immigration and
regional governance in the Asia Paciﬁc region. For this reason, it is important to
evaluate the conduct of states not just in terms of how they justify intervention to
their citizens but in terms of how they project a particular type of (exclusionary) ethic
within political community. It is this ‘constitutive outside’ of humanitarianism that
demands further consideration in evaluating the question of representation in humani-
tarian discourse.
Chantal Mouffe’s understanding of the ‘constitutive outside’ is relevant to under-
standing humanitarian discourse as it explicitly links the ontology of political com-
munity to particular boundaries of exclusion. Mouffe identiﬁes the bounded nature
of political community and how liberal-democratic consensus is subject to difﬁculties
that emerge from the ‘constitutive outside’.48 Her focus concerns the demarcation of
political community (demos) in terms of a discourse of inclusion and exclusion in
which the ‘enemy’ features prominently. ‘What matters’, Mouffe observes in relation
42 Ibid., p. 27.
43 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 189.
44 James Pattison, ‘Representativeness and Humanitarian Intervention’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38:4
(2007), p. 569.
45 Ibid., p. 569.
46 Ibid., p. 573.
47 Penelope Matthew, ‘Lest We Forget’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 1:1 (1999), pp. 7–59.
48 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), p. 37.
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to Carl Schmitt’s account of political community, ‘is the possibility of tracing a line
of demarcation between those who belong to the demos – and therefore have equal
rights – and those who, in the political domain, cannot have the same rights because
they are not part of the demos’.49 For Mouffe, the structure of public communication
and deliberation is always embedded in a network of power relations: ‘Consensus in
a liberal-democratic society is – and always be – the expression of a hegemony and
the crystallization of power relations.’50
Linklater has observed that ‘it is not beyond the ingenuity of the human race to
rise above increasingly problematical particularistic moralities and to create global
arrangements that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obliga-
tions to reduce distant suffering’.51 In tracing how humanitarian discourse emerges
through considerations of the ‘constitutive outside’ – implicit and/or explicit – the
focus is on the way in which humanitarian emergency is a function of political com-
munity. The question of humanitarian legitimacy should not be linked exclusively to
consensus within a liberal-democratic model but through a broader network of
power relations that arise from the conditioning of speciﬁc political communities. In
this regard, the Kantian appeal to the suffering of distant others should not be under-
stood as an intuitive morality which is forged through common experience. Linklater
invokes Schopenhauer’s principle ‘injure no one; on the contrary, help everyone as
much as you can’.52 Such a humanitarian principle is wagered on the existence of a
‘global conscience’ which assumes commonalities between strangers.53
The critical geopolitics of humanitarian responsibility
Talking in terms of a ‘global conscience’ which provides the basis for humanitarian
practice assumes that there is a ‘universal’ order of ethics and morality which under-
pins all human conduct. An analysis of this humanitarian framework from the
perspective of critical geopolitics appreciates both the limit-points of humanitarian
practice and the ways in which humanitarianism operates as a performative concept
within International Relations. Dalby has noted that critical geopolitics entails an
understanding of the ‘performance of political acts, the speciﬁcations of friends and
enemies, the designation of spaces as theirs and ours, the distinctions between hostile
and friendly places and peoples’.54
Without a doubt, the end of the Cold War provided a new focus for humanitarian
discourses within world politics. Whilst debates on humanitarian responsibility were
largely ‘curtained off ’ from mainstream scholarship in IR for most of the twentieth
century it is somewhat problematic to declare that in the period from 1989 until 2001
that the humanitarian agenda ‘comes of age’.55 Dufﬁeld has noted that there has
49 Ibid., p. 40.
50 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 49.
51 Andrew Linklater, ‘Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations’, International Politics, 44 (2007),
p. 33.
52 Ibid., p. 44.
53 Ibid.
54 Simon Dalby, ‘Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America’s new war’, Geopolitics, 8:3 (2003),
pp. 62–3.
55 Barry Munslow and Tim O’Dempsey, ‘From War on Terror to War on Weather? Rethinking humani-
tarianism in a new era of chronic emergencies’, Third World Quarterly, 31:8 (2010), p. 1124.
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been a ‘marked upswing in all forms of aid-led humanitarian, development and peace
interventionism following the end of the Cold War’ but rightly observes that this is
strongly linked to the politicisation of human development issues within IR during
this period.56 An assessment of this humanitarian framework must factor in the
ways in which humanitarian issues have involved the securitisation of human rights
by political actors. Conceived in terms of a ‘speech act’ humanitarianism involves the
structuring of multiple subject positions concerning how and by whom humanitarian
duties demand consequent action. Using the work of the Copenhagen School,
Watson has recently noted that ‘humanitarian security’ differs signiﬁcantly from state
or societal security in terms of its priority on human life.57 As summarised by
Watson, ‘[w]hile state and societal security discourses also concern human life, they
serve to prioritize the state or society as the means of protecting human life and
dignity, whereas the discourse of humanitarian security attempts to prioritize human
life over the interests of states and/or societies.’58 Claiming that humanitarianism
prioritises ‘human life’ at the expense of the interests of states is loaded with signiﬁ-
cant normative content. Not only does it assume that ‘human life’ can be separated
from the fate of political communities, notably states, but it also presumes that there
exists a line of demarcation between national interest and human life. What consti-
tutes human life is entwined within political communities and a geopolitical perspec-
tive assists in tracing the ways in which human life is understood within multiple
cultural, social, historical and geographical locations.
Considering how humanitarianism is discursively structured as a geopolitical con-
cept involves taking humanitarianism beyond its normative claims and examining
how it provides a structure of address for political claims within IR. In terms of talk-
ing about humanitarian responsibility, then it demands greater attention to the ways
in which humanitarian responsibilities are assigned and ultimately acted upon within
IR. Assigning humanitarian responsibility must acknowledge that sovereignty and
rights, at both the individual and collective level, are inextricably linked to the
emergence (and more importantly, legitimacy) of the modern state. States are unques-
tionably more than the sum total of their geography and for this reason a spatialised
understanding of geopolitics contributes a historical dimension to the study of states
within IR.
Whilst it is important to consider the global distribution of political responsibility
within IR, especially in relation to humanitarianism, it is nonetheless important to
think about how institutional agents (whether at the local, state, or global level)
self-identify their humanitarian agency not only in terms of responsibility but also
as legitimate actors alongside other institutional agents within International Rela-
tions. In this regard, it is not possible to evade the question of how particular claims
about international justice achieve authoritative signiﬁcance across policy networks
as well political communities. The discourse of humanitarianism presupposes a range
of subject positions that are simultaneously grounded epistemologically and ontolog-
ically. This dimension of collective agency has been addressed by Toni Erskine in
56 Mark Dufﬁeld, ‘The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring
the Global Life-Chance Divide’, Security Dialogue, 41:53 (2010).
57 Scott Watson, ‘The ‘human’ as referent object? Humanitarianism as securitization’, Security Dialogue,
42:3 (2011), p. 5.
58 Ibid.
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her discussion of institutional responsibility within International Relations. In noting
the importance of linking individual agency to collective agency she identiﬁes the
fundamental communitarian aspect of just war theory: ‘The individual soldier can
be expected to uphold the duty not to shoot at a civilian intentionally; he cannot
reasonably be burdened with the duty not to engage in a war of aggression.’59 For
this reason, talking in terms of a generalised ‘international community’ in relation
to humanitarianism neglects the constitutive dimensions of agency within inter-
national relations: ‘Not only does the international community lack an identity that
is independent of the identities of its constitutive members, but it does not have a
decision-making capacity.’60
Whilst humanitarian responsibility of necessity invokes a universal claim con-
cerning international justice it is worth noting the importance of particular notions
of responsibility within International Relations. An assessment of humanitarianism
from the standpoint of geopolitics might appear to endorse Reinhold Niebuhr’s read-
ing of morality within International Relations as a zone of hypocrisy. In linking the
use of force within IR to the constitution of political community Niebuhr noted that
‘one method of making force morally redemptive is to place it in the hands of a com-
munity, which transcends the conﬂicts of interest between individual nations and has
an impartial perspective upon them’.61 According to Niebuhr, the establishment of a
political collectivity which transcends discourses of national interest – an interna-
tional community – is limited by the belief that ‘nations are too selﬁsh and morally
too obtuse’ to strive for international justice.62 Critical geopolitics might acknowl-
edge the limitations of universal conceptions of international justice in humanitarian
discourses but this does not necessarily entail the abrogation of political responsibility
from the analysis itself. Identifying the geopolitical dimensions of humanitarian
discourse allows for a more complex discourse of responsibility in responding to
humanitarian crisis. Erskine has remarked that if we are to grapple with institutional
responsibility then we must correctly identify ‘the agents’ within the international
system.63 In a similar vein, critical geopolitics demands a reassessment of the univer-
salising pretensions of humanitarian discourse. This means that is no longer sufﬁcient
to talk of humanitarianism as a value-laden discourse but instead as one which is
embedded in deep forms of agency.
Both Niebuhr and Erskine share the belief that endless talk of an international
community is largely meaningless when confronted with the institutional dynamics
of the international system. Yet where Erskine might be willing to confer moral
agency within institutions it is evident that Niebuhr is unwilling to endorse such
moral resilience within the international order. Erskine places the emphasis on moral
agency and how this engenders an ethic of responsibility for institutional agency
within international relations.
59 Toni Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and Quasi-
States’, Ethics & International Affairs, 15:2 (2001), p. 73.
60 Ibid.
61 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A study in Ethics and Politics (London: Continuum,
2005), p. 72.
62 Ibid.
63 Toni Erskine, ‘Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case of States and Quasi-
States’, Ethics & International Affairs, 15:2 (2001), p. 73.
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Nicholas Wheeler notes that humanitarian rescue, especially its military dimen-
sion, brings to the forefront the conﬂict between ‘order’ and ‘justice’ within interna-
tional society.64 Not only does this presume that the space of ‘international society’
can be clearly demarcated but it also takes for granted that humanitarian conduct
involves soldiers from one political community risking their own lives for the sake
of the stranger who inhabits a remote political community. There is a tension in
Wheeler’s framework between the moral community implied by the concept of ‘inter-
national society’ and the agency of individual soldiers who possess a particular form
of citizenship which stands in contradistinction to those human beings who are the
objects of humanitarian intervention. This tension can be understood in terms of the
way in which political communities who engage in humanitarian conduct – those
doing the saving – must negotiate the legitimacy of their intervention both domesti-
cally and internationally. A universalising concept of humanitarianism is not sufﬁ-
cient to understand these richly textured dimensions of political community. Thus,
linking humanitarian discourse to the geopolitical dimensions of the international
system should not be thought of as simply a mapping exercise but, on the contrary,
as an analysis of how power and knowledge circulates within international life.
Critical geopolitics and humanitarian conduct
Mark Dufﬁeld has recently remarked that ‘saving strangers has become a dangerous
occupation’.65 In this regard, Dufﬁeld directs us to consider how the development-
security nexus is the product of the ‘spatial geography of the global north and
south’.66 Critical geopolitics forces an awareness of how the normative capacity of
humanitarianism is embedded in a global system of power. As expressed by Daniel
Deudney, critical geopolitics is ‘focused on the global-scope system of power and
security relationships created by the technologies of the industrial revolution inter-
acting with the largest geographical features of the earth’.67 With this in mind it is
important to distinguish between geopolitics which understands the world as territor-
ialised and a critical geopolitics which understands the world as spatialised. In the
analysis of humanitarianism, it is important to avoid territorialised understandings
of geopolitics. Not only do they run the risk of replicating existing power dynamics,
in endorsing realist claims, but they also overlook how geopolitical claims are them-
selves the products of historically negotiated power dynamics. In so doing, it makes
explicit reference to Gearo´id O´ Tuathail’s understanding of critical geopolitics as ‘a
problematizing theoretical enterprise that places existing structures of power and
knowledge in question’.68
O´ Tuathail rightly differentiates between geopolitics which is indebted to a Euro-
pean legacy and geopolitics which deconstructs this legacy to understand how power
64 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 11.
65 Mark Dufﬁeld, ‘The Liberal Way of Development and the Development-Security Impasse: Exploring
the Global Life-Chance Divide’, Security Dialogue, 41:1 (2010), p. 54.
66 Ibid., p. 69.
67 Daniel Deudney, ‘Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism’, European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations, 6:1 (2000), p. 78.
68 Gearo´id O´ Tuathail, ‘Understanding critical geopolitics: Geopolitics and risk Society’, Journal of
Strategic Studies, 22:2 (2000), p. 107.
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is inscribed within complex geographies of difference. According to O´ Tuathail,
critical geopolitics endeavours to ‘recover the complexities of global political life
and expose the power relationships that characterize knowledge about geopolitics
concealed by orthodox geopolitics’.69 Invoking Robert Cox’s well-known dichotomy
between problem-solving and critical theory in International Relations, O´ Tuathail
argues that the former concentrates on the ‘balance of power’ whilst the latter con-
cerns structures of political knowledge that condition our understanding of the inter-
national system.
Reading humanitarianism through the framework of critical geopolitics raises an
important question concerning the traditional focus of just war theory and its pre-
occupation with the legal basis of aggression and territorialised understandings of
sovereignty within the international system: how do discourses of just war, when
stretched to the limits of the legalist paradigm, reimagine the just use of force within
international relations? Just war theory has faced two signiﬁcant challenges in the
aftermath of the Cold War and these have been interpolated through speciﬁc spatial
histories within the post-1989 international system. The advent of ‘new wars’ and the
new agenda for international security initiated by the September 11 attacks have forced
just war theorists to reimagine the dimensions of violence within IR itself. Nonetheless,
an appeal to transcendental truths about what constitutes a just or unjust use of force
within international relations overlooks the embedded rationalities of judgement
(and judging) within an international system that are inscribed geopolitically.
Gerry Simpson has expressed this geopolitical dimension of international law in
his account of legalised hegemony; namely, the international legal order needs to
be understood in terms of core-periphery relations and how these are expressions of
relative power status within the international system. ‘Legalized hegemony’, Simpson
argues, ‘is indistinguishable from superpower dominance in that the former requires
a commitment to long – term collective action together with a formal constitutional
validation of these collective goals and processes’.70 An awareness of the geopolitical
dimensions of international law takes legality beyond the formalism or objectivism of
law within the international system.71 The critical legal studies movement has drawn
attention to the ways in which law must be understood within its social context, high-
lighting the tendency of legal frameworks to be frozen and to thereby cast aside the
political dynamics at work within law itself.
Taking geopolitics as the basis of international humanitarian law does not neces-
sarily undermine the efﬁcacy of law but instead draws attention to the historical
sociology of law-making and law-enforcement within international relations. The
centrality of the state as the referent object for both international relations and inter-
national law provides a largely ahistorical interpretation of sovereignty within the
international system. A critical geopolitics – one which links legality to the political
cartography of the international system – enables a more pertinent reading of the
69 Ibid.
70 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 75.
71 Roberto Unger deﬁnes objectivism within law in the following way: ‘Objectivism is the belief that
the authoritative legal materials – the system of statutes, cases, and accepted legal ideas – embody and
sustain a defensible scheme of human association. They display, though always imperfectly, an intelligible
moral order. . . . The laws are not merely the outcome of contingent power struggles or of practical pres-
sures lacking in rightful authority.’ Roberto Mangebeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 2.
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inability of contemporary just war theory to make commensurable the competing
discourses of internal/external justiﬁcations for democracy promotion. Koskenniemi’s
claim that international relations is ‘in the relevant respects still the realm of the excep-
tional and thus a proper realm not for the application of rules but for statesmanship’
is relevant to making sense of the rationalities of international law.72 These legal
rationalities can be understood hegemonically (Koskenniemi) or pluralistically (Unger)
but the essential character of law is its emergence through regimes of power.
If critical geopolitics dislodges the focus on the universal dimensions of humani-
tarianism then it is also important to think about the ways in which international law
itself can be understood as a spatial ordering of speciﬁc traditions in jurisprudence.
In this regard, Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth’ presents a critique of the liberal juris-
prudential model in international relations, especially its desire to establish a univer-
sally recognised model of international law. Schmitt is concerned with the inability
of the European tradition of law – jus publicum Europeaum – to provide a structure
for order within an international sphere marked by both geographical and cultural
divisions. This law originally concerned the law existing between European sovereign
states. One of its primary assumptions was that European public law provided a
compelling template for governance and order beyond the European world. In this
respect, Schmitt warns against an image of the international which rests upon
‘global’ assumptions about the capacity of European law to remake the world.
Schmitt argues that for centuries ‘humanity had a mythical image of the earth, but
no scientiﬁc understanding of the whole’.73 This mythical image of the earth failed
to take seriously the division of the world into geopolitical units, each embodying
their own image of law vis-a`-vis other traditions.
For Schmitt, the belief that European public law can become a foundation for
international law rests upon a faulty understanding of nomos in international rela-
tions. Schmitt warns against thinking of nomos in terms of the customary principles
governing conduct at the international level. To proclaim that there is law at the
international law (and that this nomos provides a structure for order) is to overlook
the fact that nomos ﬁrst emerges through the process of land acquisition. Schmitt
wants to retain the original sense of the word nomos which means ‘to divide’ and
‘to pasture’ the earth rather than law as the regulation of the norm.74 For this reason,
Schmitt notes that we should not lose sight of the fact that nomos refers ‘to a con-
stitutive act of spatial ordering’.75 This spatial ordering is historically grounded, and
involves the establishment of clear geopolitical divisions across the earth. These divi-
sions constitute ﬁxed entities, each carrying with them comprehensive worldviews
that invalidate universalistic claims about the capacity of international law to operate
across the world. The important thing to note about Schmitt’s understanding of
nomos is that it places the emphasis on the geopolitical domain – the division of the
world into states – rather than international law as mirror of a cosmopolitan or
international ethic. In this regard, Schmitt stresses the need to think in terms of states
72 Martti Koskenniemia, ‘International law and hegemony: a reconﬁguration’, Cambridge Review of Inter-
national Affairs (2004), 17:2, p. 213.
73 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York:
Telos Press, 2003), p. 50.
74 Ibid., p. 70.
75 Ibid., p. 71.
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rather than humanity.76 For Schmitt, nomos refers to the fundamental process of
apportioning space. In claiming that ‘the original act is nomos’ Schmitt does not
invoke an originary myth in which the order of the earth can be understood in terms
of previous geopolitical divisions. This is because each era generates its own nomos:
Such constitutive processes are certainly not everyday occurrences, but neither are they simply
matters of bygone times and only of archaeological or antiquarian interest today. As long as
world history remains open and ﬂuid, as long as conditions are not ﬁxed and ossiﬁed; in other
words, as long as human beings and peoples have not only a past but also a future, a new
nomos will arise in the perpetually new manifestation of world-historical events. Thus, for us,
nomos is a matter of the fundamental process of apportioning space that is essential to every
historical epoch – a matter of the structure-determining convergence of order and orientation
in the cohabitation of peoples on this now scientiﬁcally surveyed planet. This is the sense in
which the nomos of the earth is spoken here. Every new age and every new epoch in the
coexistence of peoples, empires, and countries, of rulers and power formations of every sort,
is founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures, and new spatial orders of the earth.77
Schmitt’s concept of nomos thereby involves drawing a distinction between nomos as
the appropriation of the earth (territorially establishing the conditions by which the
world is subsequently divided) and the notion of nomos as a normative statement
about the possibility of global order. According to Ulmen, Schmitt introduces the
term nomos in 1934 to talk of ‘concrete order thinking’ rather than positivist ‘legal
order’ thinking which is largely grounded in the normative.78 Mitchell Dean echoes
this in noting that Schmitt’s concept of nomos can be read as an attack on the
‘decadence of present-day legal thinking and [a desire] to establish a theory of the
preconditions of concrete social orders’.79 In saying that men rather than law should
provide the basis for understanding the dynamics of state conduct at the interna-
tional level Schmitt is warning against the reiﬁcation of international law. That is to
say, international law should be understood in terms of the existing spatial ordering
of the world (especially its divisions) rather than as the embodiment of substantive,
universal truths about law. This is reﬂected in Schmitt’s demand that international
law be conceived in terms of the ‘element orders’ of ‘terrestrial being’ and how these
orders have largely been shaped by a European tradition of jurisprudence.80
This demand for concrete level thinking about international order (as distinct
from normative reﬂection on the international) is evident in Schmitt’s rejection of
76 See also Carl Schmitt, ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), The Challenge of
Carl Schmitt, (London: Verso, 1999). Schmitt argues against the universalism of humanity and in
favour of concrete political communities through the state. See, in particular, p. 205.
77 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, pp. 78–9.
78 See the translator’s introduction to Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth. Ulmen argues that Schmitt envisaged
a ‘concrete territorial spatial order’ (that is, a nomos of the earth) which would allow new friend/enemy
groupings to emerge in international politics. Concrete order thinking is contrasted to normative think-
ing. See, for deeper discussion of this point, Ulmen’s claim that Schmitt is critical of those who think
that ‘law, not men’ should rule. Ibid., pp. 19–20.
79 Mitchell Dean, ‘A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl Schmitt’s Nomos’, Theory, Culture &
Society, 23:5 (2006), p. 4. Dean argues that Schmitt ‘is a thinker concerned with humankind’s necessarily
telluric (or earth-bound) character; the philology of nomos reveals not the primacy of appropriation but
the concrete existence of human communities in their occupancy of the earth and orientation on it. This
nomos exists prior to nomads, movement, borders, territories, settlements and households, and above
all, positive laws. Nomos – at least in the versions familiar to non-nomadic societies – is, as he sharply
puts it, a ‘‘fence-word’’: it creates territory, deﬁnes locality, marks places, separates backyards and
deﬁnes households.’ Ibid., p. 7.
80 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York:
Telos Press, 2003), p. 39.
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Hellenic cosmopolitan law. Schmitt rejects the cosmopolitanism of Hellenic states as
an example of international order since it endeavours to make a world-state out of a
city-state.81 The spatial order of the earth, in order to be truly global, must under-
stand the earth as a whole. It must not generalise what it takes to be a global order
from a speciﬁc legal order. Yet, for Schmitt, this is essentially what the jus publicum
Europeaum has done in relation to international law. International law, ﬁltered
through the prism of the jus publicum Europeaum, fails to transcend the territorial
division of the world into European and non-European peoples. Schmitt’s concept
of nomos thereby operates as a methodological tool by which the international
system can be understood. The important thing to note is that the international is to
be understood through historical particulars rather than the establishment of transhi-
storical universals.
For Schmitt, the concept of nomos can be understood as the ‘constitutive legal
process’ of the international system.82 Paying attention to the historical development
of nomos – between and within states – invalidates the claim of the jus publicum
Europeaum to operate as a foundation for international law and order. This is
because nomos should be framed in relation to three processes which, by their very
nature, undermine the very notion of the international. These three processes –
appropriation, distribution, and production – are fundamental to the spatial order
of the international system. They involve the fusion of the territorial (an ability to
distinguish mine from thine) with a concept of the political (an ability to distinguish
friend from enemy). For Schmitt, the ﬁrst notion of nomos involves the appropria-
tion of land which was recognised in Locke’s concept of property. Schmitt endorses
Locke’s notion of property as jurisdiction over the land. Thus, Schmitt argues that
land appropriation is ‘the archetype of a constitutive legal process externally (vis-a`-
vis other peoples) and internally (for the ordering of land and property within a
country)’.83 Distribution is the second dimension of nomos. Looking at the way in
which the resources of the world are divided across the international system is neces-
sary to understanding the spatial ordering of the globe.84 The third dimension of
nomos involves a qualitative assessment of the internal workings of a given territorial
space, especially consideration of its processes of production. Thus, Schmitt assigns
nomos a primary role in the internal and external workings of the state:
Each of these three processes – appropriation, distribution, and production – is part and
parcel of the history of legal and social orders. In ever stage of social life, in every economic
order, in every period of legal history until now, things have been appropriated, distributed,
and produced. Prior to every legal, economic, and social order, prior to every legal, economic,
or social theory are these elementary questions: Where and how was it appropriated? Where
and how was it divided? Where and how was it produced?85
Schmitt regards states as the primary vehicles of appropriation, distribution, and
production across the earth. Expressing a disbelief in the capacity of law to govern
81 This is evident in Schmitt’s claim that ‘we can disregard the philosophical generalizations of the
Hellenistic period, which made a cosmopolis [world-state] out of a polis [city-state], because they lacked
a topos [orientation], and thus had no concrete order’. Ibid., p. 50.
82 Ibid., p. 47.
83 Ibid.
84 Schmitt expresses this in the following terms: ‘Concretely speaking, nomos is, for example, the chicken
in every pot that every peasant living under a good king has on Sunday, the parcel of land every farmer
cultivates as his property, and the car every American worker has parked in his garage.’ Ibid., p. 327.
85 Ibid., pp. 327–8.
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the earth (‘in the name of humanity’) Schmitt looks to the speciﬁc distribution of
the earth through territorially bounded states. A system of international law that
invokes ‘humanity’ overlooks how law is legitimated through the original act of
appropriation. Thus, speaking in terms of a ‘world unity’ would require there to be
a spatial order in which the world was held in common. This would mean the suspen-
sion of established geopolitical divisions and the possibility of preventing future divi-
sions from emerging. International law would thus require humanity to ‘appropriate’
the earth:
Has humanity today actually ‘appropriated’ the earth as a unity, so that there is nothing more
to be appropriated? Has appropriation really ceased? Is there now only division and distribu-
tion? Or does only production remain? If so, we must ask further: Who is the great appropriator,
the great divider and distributor of our planet, the manager and planner of uniﬁed world
production? This question should warn us against ideological short-circuits. At work here are
widespread and generally forceful, although scientiﬁcally superﬂuous simpliﬁcations. They
suggest ﬁctional unities. Their simpliﬁcations can be overcome only by the deeper simplicity of
original concepts.86
Schmitt’s treatment of the global as a ﬁctional entity implicitly questions the capacity
of ‘the international’ to function in two respects. Firstly, the international cannot be
adopted as the organising principle by which the pluriverse can be understood. The
very notion of ‘the international’ is at odds with the radical plurality that exists
between and amongst states. Schmitt assumes that states can achieve a democratic
homogeneity within their own territories. No such assumption exists for Schmitt
when states confront each other as states; that is to say, the system sustains itself
through an ethic of statecraft. This ethic of statecraft does not allow for the grouping
of states into a universe. Secondly, the international cannot be denoted, yet alone
established, as a site of rational deliberation about the terms of political discourse
between states. Individual states may frame their claims for justice in terms of the
international but these should be regarded as expressions of national sentiment
rather than a truly international one. In this regard, Schmitt demands that the inter-
national be assessed through the lens of instrumental rationality. There is no such
thing as ‘the international’ writ large; merely a constellation of states each endeav-
ouring to give their image of world order a foundation in the actual. International
law can thus be understood as a form of ‘political myth-making’ because its legality
is not bound up in the processes which give domestic law its legitimacy.87 A concern
with the geopolitics of humanitarianism stresses the relational dimension of political
actors within the international system, whether conceived in terms of national collec-
tivities or shared values that emerge from geopolitical groupings. In this regard,
international law should be understood in terms of its historical sociology rather
than an impartial set of rules which regulate the conditions of international life. A
concern with the geopolitics of humanitarianism would therefore involve the refusal
of the stability of international judicial processes and mechanisms. Schmitt expresses
this in terms of the ontology of international law and, in so doing, draws attention to
how international law should be understood: ‘There are relations between states
wherever political unities exist alongside each other peacefully or hostilely. Inter-
national law is the sum of customary or conventionally recognized rules for these
86 Ibid., p. 335.
87 Ibid., p. 117.
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relations of mere coexistence.’88 In thinking of international law as relations of mere
coexistence there is a theoretical move against objectivism in international law;
namely, international law should be understood not as a series of regulations or
decrees but in terms of its capacity to negotiate relations between and amongst states
within the international system. International law is recognised through legal con-
vention and involves shared understandings about the validity and authority of law.
This means, for instance, that talk of the ‘international legal communit’ must be
contingently understood. The international legal community only refers to a particular
moment in a particular space-time horizon. Schmitt expresses international law
as the ‘preponderance of rules that in fact varies from case to case from relation to
relation’.89
Thus, to speak in terms of an international legal order requires a contingent under-
standing of sovereignty within the international system. The tendency to reduce inter-
national law down to a rigid body of statute overlooks this contingent understanding
of legal order. For Schmitt,
One may understand the concept of order not as a closed system of norms, but rather as
something that is present existentially. This international legal community is not a contract, nor
is it based on a contract. It is also not an alliance and still less a federation. It does not have a
constitution in the distinctive sense. It is, instead, the reﬂex of the politically plural universe,
which expresses itself in individual, generally recognized rules and considerations. In other
words, it is a pluralistic universe understood as a multitude of political entities that exist
alongside each other.90
To talk of the international community as having a constitution and thereby reﬂect-
ing principles of international cosmopolitan law is therefore insufﬁcient. The interna-
tional community does not embody universal principles of justice but articulates a
universal claim about what constitutes political right from its particular standpoint/s.
The vision of international law depicted by Habermas is therefore unsustainable when
international law is understood as the multitude of political entities.91 International
law should not be understood in terms of a legal contract in which states negotiate
the boundary between domestic law and international law.
In establishing humanitarianism in terms of a universal discourse of humanity
there are three areas – impartiality, neutrality, and universality – which present a
challenge for understanding the historical sociology of international law. These all
relate to methodological and political questions which arise out of the geopolitical
foundations of International Relations and condition the very rationality of inter-
national legal order. The challenge of international law is therefore to reconcile the
emergence of international legal order as a contingent process of the geopolitical
imagination with the desire of international legal order to operate impartially,
neutrally, and universally. As stated above, framing humanitarianism as purely a
‘cosmopolitan’ question is to overlook the multiple articulations of international law
88 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 381.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Schmitt argues that ‘one can portray general and abstract norms as the ‘‘constitution’’ of the inter-
national legal community to the same limited degree that one can ﬁnd the ‘‘constitution’’ of a family
in general norms such as that ‘‘you should honor your father and mother’’ or ‘‘love thy neighbour.’’
In particular, it is a fruitless endeavour to portray general principles like ‘‘right before might’’ or the
‘‘sanctity of contracts as the constitution of the international legal community and to falsely ascribe
the character of a genuine federation to the general ‘‘international legal community’’.’ Ibid., p. 381.
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that circulate within both the study and conduct of international politics. This article
has endeavoured to challenge this framing, bringing into focus the importance of
thinking about geopolitics in spatial rather than territorialised ways. Not all humani-
tarianism is equivalent to cosmopolitan law (as imagined by Habermas); nor should
we think of international law as ‘the concept of interest deﬁned in terms of power’.92
Humanitarian law should not wager its future on the successful implementation of
Kantian cosmopolitan law but should instead critically understand how geopolitical
meanings underpin the very notion of international legal order.
92 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1978), p. 4.
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